Justia Drugs & Biotech Opinion Summaries

Wake Forest is the owner of asserted patents, and KCI are the exclusive licensees of the patents, which claim methods and apparatuses for treating difficult-to-heal wounds by applying suction or negative pressure. In response to S&N’s 2008 announcement that it was launching a new foam-based negative pressure wound treatment product, Wake Forest and KCI asserted that S&N infringes two apparatus claims of the patent and induces infringement of four method claims. Rejecting the jury’s findings of non-obviousness, the district court found obviousness, based on prior art, and rejected infringement claims. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. The objective evidence strongly supported the jury’s findings under the first three Graham factors and cut against the view that the claimed inventions were an obvious combination of known elements from the prior art. View "Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc." on Justia Law

Apotex submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to the FDA seeking approval to market a generic version of the anti-allergy eye drop Patanol. Alcon, which markets Patanol, sued Apotex for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A). Alcon asserted claims 1-8 of the patent, which is listed in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book) entry for Patanol. The district court held that claims would not have been obvious over the prior art and were not invalid. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Objective evidence indicated that claims 4 and 8 would not have been obvious. Patanol’s achieving nearly 70% market share within two years of its launch, demonstrates that “the commercial success was caused by the merits of the invention as distinct from the prior art.” The remaining claims were, however, obvious. A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention would have been motivated to use olopatadine to treat human eye allergies as claimed for its established antihistaminic efficacy. View "Alcon Research, Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc." on Justia Law

Lovenox (enoxaparin) prevents blood clots. Enoxaparin is a version of heparin. Heparin molecules have considerable diversity in characteristics. Additional diversity is introduced when heparin is broken down, raising a problem with the FDA abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process. ANDAs are used to obtain approval for a generic version of an existing drug and do not require extensive studies needed to initially prove the drug’s safety and efficacy. Aventis, which marketed Lovenox, asked the FDA to deny ANDA approval for a generic enoxaparin unless the applicant took certain steps. The FDA rejected Aventis’s arguments, stating that ANDA does not describe the information necessary to demonstrate that the active ingredient in the generic product is the same as the active ingredient in the reference drug. The FDA identified its own criteria for determining that generic enoxaparin has the same active ingredient as Lovenox. Amphastar was first to file an ANDA for generic enoxaparin and received FDA approval in2011. Momenta was first to bring generic enoxaparin to market, obtaining FDA approval more than a year earlier. Momenta alleged that Amphastar infringed its patent for analyzing heparin and obtained an injunction. The district court found that Amphastar’s quality control batch testing infringed the patent. The Federal Circuit vacated. The court applied an unduly narrow interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor, 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1).View "Momenta Pharma., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharma, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to develop a rapid, self-administered test to determine a person’s HIV status. The development process included collection of human blood and saliva samples. Plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the destruction of its blood and saliva specimens by the Food and Drug Administration. The specimens had been seized during a criminal investigation and the freezer in which they were stored broke down. The district court entered summary judgment that the suit arose from a law enforcement officer’s detention of property, excepting the claims from the FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. 2680(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government presented uncontroverted evidence that the officer detained the specimens as a law enforcement officer View "On-Site Screening, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Borrome, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, and, since 1996 a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. pled guilty in 2002 to violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301-399d, prohibitions on unlicensed wholesale distribution of prescription “drugs” in interstate commerce. He was sentenced him to four months’ imprisonment followed by four months’ home confinement. In 2010 he was served with a notice of removal and the IJ reasoned that because Borrome’s offense involved unauthorized distribution of a Schedule II controlled substance (Oxycontin ), it is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) pursuant to the “hypothetical federal felony test,” so that Borrome was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) as an alien convicted of violating any law “relating to a controlled substance.” The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Borrome has been removed from the United States. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that violation of the FDCA wholesale distribution provisions does not constitute an aggravated felony and that those laws are not laws relating to a controlled substance. View "Borrome v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

Schering held a patent on the controlled release coating applied to potassium chloride crystals for treatment of potassium deficiencies. Potential generic manufacturers filed an abbreviated application for approval (ANDA),Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. 301-399, asserting that the Schering patent was invalid or would not be infringed by their new generic drugs. Schering’s subsequent infringement suits were resolved through agreements in which it paid the generic manufacturers to drop patent challenges and refrain from producing a generic drug for a specified period. Congress amended Hatch-Waxman to require pharmaceutical companies who enter into such settlements to file for antitrust review. The FTC filed an antitrust action with respect to Schering’s settlements. Plaintiffs sued on behalf of a class of purchasers of the drug. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s certification of the class, but reversed its presumption that Schering’s patent was valid and gave Schering the right to exclude infringing products until the end of its term, including through reverse payment settlements. The court directed use of a “quick look rule of reason analysis” based on economic realities of the settlement rather than labels. The court must treat any payment from a patent holder to a patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market as prima facie evidence of unreasonable restraint of trade, rebuttable by showing that the payment was for a purpose other than delayed entry or offers some pro-competitive benefit. View "In Re: K-Dur Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Lupin submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to the Food and Drug Administration seeking approval to market a generic version of Fortamet, an extended-release tablet of metaformin hydrochloride. Shionogi, which markets Fortamet, sued Lupin for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A) asserting, among others, the 866 patent), which is listed in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book) entry for Fortamet. Lupin attempted to launch its generic Fortamet “at risk,”( without a final judgment on the merits in the litigation). Shionogi obtained a preliminary injunction. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court incorrectly concluded that Lupin failed to raise a substantial question of validity regarding the asserted claims of the 866 patent, an abused its discretion by issuing a preliminary injunction. View "Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin, Ltd." on Justia Law

Humana sued, alleging that Glaxo was obligated to reimburse Humana for expenses Humana had incurred treating its insureds’ injuries resulting from Glaxo’s drug, Avandia. Humana runs a Medicare Advantage plan. Its complaint asserts that, pursuant to the Medicare Act, Glaxo is in this instance a “primary payer” obligated to reimburse Humana as a “secondary payer.” The district court dismissed, agreeing with Glaxo that the Medicare Act did not provide Medicare Advantage organizations with a private cause of action to seek such reimbursement. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The Medicare Secondary Payer Act, in 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(3)(A), provides Humana with a private cause of action against Glaxo. Even if the provision is ambiguous, regulations issued by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services make clear that the provision extends the private cause of action to MAOs. View "Humana Med. Plan Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC" on Justia Law

Stryker, a manufacturer of medical devices, sued its umbrella insurer XL, seeking coverage for claims stemming from the implantation of expired artificial knees. The dispute concerned the precise "defect" that triggers batch coverage under the Medical Products Endorsement. The district court held that XL was liable under the policy for the entirety of Stryker’s losses on both direct claims brought against Stryker, as well as claims brought against Pfizer that Stryker was obligated to reimburse under an asset purchase agreement. The court found that the items were defective if they were available in Stryker’s inventory for implantation by physicians beyond their shelf-life of five years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed XL’s liability for the full amount of Stryker’s losses and pre-judgment interest. XL’s payment to Pfizer applies to exhaust the policy with respect to the direct claims. The court reversed the holding that the aggregate limit of liability of the XL policy does not apply to the judgments on the direct claims and remanded for determination of what portion, if any, of the total liability for those judgments beyond $15 million represents consequential damages as defined under Michigan contract law. View "Howmedica Osteonics, Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

TIG issued a $25 million excess policy to Stryker, a manufacturer of medical devices. Coverage attached above the underlying (XL) umbrella policy, with a limit of $15 million. Stryker sued XL, seeking defense and indemnification for claims related to replacement knees (first suit). Pfizer then sued Stryker, seeking indemnification with respect to claims based on Uni-Knees; the companies had an asset purchase agreement. The court ruled in favor of Pfizer. When XL denied coverage, Stryker sued both insurers. In 2008, the district court held that XL was liable for all of Stryker's liabilities with respect to both suits and also granted declaratory judgment against TIG. XL settled directly with Pfizer, and obtained a ruling that this satisfied its obligations. TIG moved to remove the declaratory judgment ruling, arguing that the ruling that XL was responsible with respect to both suits made it impossible to subject TIG to liability. The district court denied this motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the case is not moot, noting that the claims may exhaust the XL policy; reversed a ruling that TIG is precluded from raising coverage defenses on remand, noting that TIG was not a party to the first suit; and remanded. View "Stryker Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law