Justia Drugs & Biotech Opinion Summaries

Bivalirudin is a synthetic peptide used to prevent blood clotting in patients undergoing cardiac catheterization. Bivalirudin’s pharmacological properties were known before the filing of Medicines’ 727 and 343 patents and were covered by Medicines’ 404 patent, which expired in 2015. The claimed inventions of the 727 and 343 patents are directed to minimizing impurities in batches of bivalirudin, an active ingredient, typically distributed as a dry powder that must be compounded with a base before being administered to a patient as an intravenous injection. Medicines received FDA approval to market a base-compounded bivalirudin drug product in 2000, and has sold the approved product since 2001 under the tradename ANGIOMAX®, before the critical date of the 727-343 patents. Mylan submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application, seeking to market a generic version of ANGIOMAX. The district court held that the 343 patent was not infringed because Mylan did not satisfy the “efficient mixing” limitation of asserted claims and that the 727 patent was infringed because its asserted claims did not include an “efficient mixing” limitation. Without addressing the validity of the patents, the Federal Circuit reversed as to the 727 patent and affirmed as to the 343 patent. Both include a “batches” limitation that requires batch consistency, which, according to the patents, is achieved through efficient mixing. Efficient mixing is required by the asserted claims of both patents. View "The Medicines Co. v. Mylan, Inc." on Justia Law

The 631 application, entitled “Glenoid Implant for Minimally Invasive Shoulder Replacement Surgery,” describes an invention related to “rotator cuff sparing procedures and associated devices for shoulder replacement surgery.” The application improves on the prior art by offering “simple and less invasive perpendicular access to the humeral and glenoid joint surfaces,” which “spares the rotator cuff tendons and allows for a quicker and more functional recovery.” The surgery described in the application involves two main steps. First, the surgeon removes “a minimal amount of bone from the peripheral surface of the glenoid”—a process called reaming. Second, the surgeon places an implant in the reamed cavity. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board concluded that several claims were anticipated by prior art, 35 U.S.C. 102(b). The Federal Circuit reversed; the finding of anticipation was not supported by substantial evidence. View "In re: Chudik" on Justia Law

Hundreds of plaintiffs sued the drug manufacturer Merck, alleging that the osteoporosis drug Fosamax caused them to suffer serious thigh bone fractures. Each brought a state-law tort claim alleging that Merck failed to add an adequate warning of the risk to Fosamax’s FDA-approved drug label. Many also brought claims including defective design, negligence, and breach of warranty. Plaintiffs’ suits were consolidated in multi-district litigation in the District of New Jersey. Following discovery and a bellwether trial, the court granted Merck summary judgment, based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Wyeth v. Levine, that state-law failure-to-warn claims are preempted when there is “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have approved the warning that plaintiffs claim was necessary. The Third Circuit vacated. Preemption is an affirmative defense; Merck did not carry its burden to prove that it is entitled to that defense. The Wyeth “clear evidence” standard is demanding and fact-sensitive. It requires a court sitting in summary judgment to anticipate the range of conclusions that a reasonable juror might reach and the certainty with which the juror would reach them. Here, plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the FDA would have approved a properly-worded warning about the risk of thigh fractures—or to conclude that the odds of FDA rejection were less than highly probable. View "In Re: Fosamax Products Liability Litigation" on Justia Law

Amphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary (collectively, Amphastar) and Sandoz Inc. were competitors in the U.S. market for generic enoxaparin, an anticoagulant. Momenta Pharmaceuticals Inc. served as Sandoz’s contract laboratory. Amphastar filed a complaint alleging antitrust violations by Sandoz and Momenta based on Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations to the United States Pharmacopeial Convention, a private standard-setting organization charged with ensuring the quality of drugs. Defendants brought an infringement suit against Amphastar, resulting in a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction prohibiting Amphastar from selling enoxaparin. The preliminary injunction was later vacated, but it did prevent Amphastar from selling its generic enoxaparin for approximately three months. Amphastar then filed this suit under the Sherman Act seeking damages for lost profits during the pendency of the TRO and injunction. The district court dismissed the complaint under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which immunizes good-faith petition of government entities from antitrust liability. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in applying Noerr-Pennington. Remanded for the district court to consider Defendants’ other arguments in the first instance. View "Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc v. Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

The district court certified eight classes, consisting of persons in Illinois and Missouri who take eye drops manufactured by six pharmaceutical companies for treatment of glaucoma. Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ eye drops are unnecessarily large and wasteful, in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, and the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.010, so that the price of the eye drops is excessive and that the large eye drops have a higher risk of side effects. There was no claim that members of the class have experienced side effects or have been harmed because they ran out of them early. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss. The court noted possible legitimate reasons for large drops, the absence of any misrepresentation or collusion, and that defendants’ large eye drops have been approved by the FDA for safety and efficacy. “You cannot sue a company and argue only ‘it could do better by us,’” nor can one bring a suit in federal court without pleading that one has been injured. The plaintiffs allege only “disappointment.” View "Eike v. Allergan, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a shareholder derivative action on behalf of Medtronic, Inc., against current and former directors and officers of Medtronic, and against Medtronic as a nominal defendant. Plaintiff's complaint alleged various bad acts and false and misleading statements stemming from Medtronic's alleged improper promotion to physicians of the "off-label" use of its "Infuse" product. The district court dismissed the action based on a report by a special litigation committee (SLC). The court concluded that defendants' motion to terminate the litigation based on the SLC report could not be construed as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) nor one arising under Rule 56; the court agreed with the district court and the Eleventh Circuit that the closest fit for a motion to terminate in the Federal Rules was Rule 23.1(c); the proper standard of review was for an abuse of the district court's discretion; the district court did not err in deferring to the SLC under Minnesota's business judgment rule (BJR) where the SLC possessed a disinterested independence, and the SLC's investigative methodologies and procedures were adequate, appropriate, and pursued in good faith; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion for discovery. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kokocinski v. Collins, Jr." on Justia Law

LAB’s 903 patent claims a method of “arresting or regressing” penile fibrosis, which can result in erectile dysfunction and penile deformation, by the long-term, daily administration of type 5 phosphodiesterase (PDE5) inhibitors. At Eli Lilly’s request, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board conducted inter partes review. The patent claimed priority from a 2002 Provisional Application. The Board first rejected LAB’s argument for the earlier priority date, construed three terms, and concluded that the claim limitation requiring the delivery of a dosage of up to 1.5 mg/kg/day for at least 45 days “would meet the claim requirement of a continuous, long-term regimen,” and that the combination of three prior references rendered the claims unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding two claim constructions erroneous and that the Board did not make factual findings as to whether there was an apparent reason to combine the references to treat penile fibrosis and whether a person of skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success from such a combination. In a separate opinion, the court specifically addressed one prior reference, Whitaker, stating that it may “suggest” long-term daily treatment by noting the beneficial effects of daily treatment (better erectile response and decreased side effects), but that is not enough. Whitaker does not disclose the claimed treatment regimen with sufficient clarity to satisfy the demanding standard for anticipation. View "Eli Lilly & Co, v. Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute" on Justia Law

LAB’s 903 patent claims a method of “arresting or regressing” penile fibrosis, which can result in erectile dysfunction and penile deformation, by the long-term, daily administration of type 5 phosphodiesterase (PDE5) inhibitors. At Eli Lilly’s request, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board conducted inter partes review. The patent claimed priority from a 2002 Provisional Application. The Board first rejected LAB’s argument for the earlier priority date, finding that the specification of the provisional application did not disclose the dosage limitation, then construed: “an individual with at least one of penile tunical fibrosis and corporal tissue fibrosis”; “arresting or regressing the at least one of the penile tunical fibrosis and corporal tissue fibrosis”; and “continuous long-term regimen.” The Board concluded that the claim limitation requiring the delivery of a dosage of up to 1.5 mg/kg/day for at least 45 days “would meet the claim requirement of a continuous, long-term regimen,” and that the combination of three prior references rendered the claims unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding two claim constructions erroneous and that the Board did not make factual findings as to whether there was an apparent reason to combine the references to treat penile fibrosis and whether a person of skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success from such a combination. View "Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute v. Eli Lilly & Co." on Justia Law

Shire sued Watson for infringing the 720 patent by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the FDA seeking to market a generic version of Shire’s drug, LIALDA®. The patent is directed to a controlled-release oral pharmaceutical composition of mesalamine used to treat inflammatory bowel diseases. The district court rejected Watson’s invalidity arguments that the patent lacked written description and enablement, and held that Watson infringed two claims. On appeal, and again after remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit stated that the matrix compositions are “limited by the Markush groups” added during prosecution “to overcome the examiner’s rejection of the claims as obvious” and that “the correct construction requires that the inner volume contain substances from the group described for the inner lipophilic matrix (which are all lipophilic substances), and that the outer volume separately contain substances from the group described for the outer hydrophilic matrix (which are all hydrophilic).” On remand, the district court concluded that Watson’s ANDA Product satisfied the “inner lipophilic matrix” and “outer hydrophilic matrix” limitations and satisfied the Markush limitations because the excipients falling outside the respective Markush groups were “unrelated” to the invention since they did not drive the water-affinity property of their respective matrices. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment of non-infringement. Watson’s ANDA Product does not satisfy the Markush group requirements. View "Shire Development, LLC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that Takeda prevented competitors from timely marketing a generic version of Takeda’s diabetes drug ACTOS by falsely describing two patents to the FDA. Plaintiffs claimed that these false patent descriptions channeled Takeda’s competitors into a generic drug approval process that granted the first-filing applicants a 180-day exclusivity period, which in turn acted as a 180-day "bottleneck" to all later-filing applicants. 9 out of 10 generic applicants took that route. Teva was prevented from seeking approval via another regulatory mechanism when the FDA announced that all generic manufacturers would be required to take the bottlenecked route. Plaintiffs alleged that they were wrongfully obligated to pay monopoly prices for ACTOS when Takeda's patent on the active ingredient in ACTOS expired when the mass of generic market entry occurred. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' antitrust claims. The court affirmed to the extent that plaintiffs' theory posits a delay in the marketing of generic alternatives to ACTOS by all the generic applicants other than Teva, because plaintiffs' theory presupposes that these applicants were aware of Takeda’s allegedly false patent descriptions when they filed their applications, which is not supported by well-pleaded allegations. However, the court concluded that plaintiffs' theory as to Teva does not require any knowledge of the false patent descriptions. Therefore, the court reached other issues as to Teva and found plaintiffs plausibly alleged that Takeda delayed Teva's market entry. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re ACTOS End-Payor Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law