Justia Drugs & Biotech Opinion Summaries
Eagle Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Slayback Pharma LLC
Eage filed suit, alleging infringement of four patents under the doctrine of equivalents, stemming from Slayback’s new drug application for a generic version of Eagle’s branded bendamustine product, BELRAPZO®. Bendamustine is used to treat chronic lymphocytic leukemia and indolent B-cell non-Hodgkin lymphoma. The district court entered a judgment of non-infringement on the pleadings.The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Eagle’s arguments that the district court erred when it concluded that the asserted patents disclose, but do not claim, ethanol—and therefore dedicated ethanol to the public and that the district court improperly applied the dedication disclosure doctrine at the pleadings stage, in the presence of factual disputes and without drawing all inferences in Eagle’s favor. The disclosure-dedication doctrine bars application of the doctrine of equivalents: “when a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter, . . . this action dedicates the unclaimed subject matter to the public.” The application of the doctrine is a question of law. The asserted patents disclose ethanol as an alternative to propylene glycol in the “pharmaceutically acceptable fluid” claim limitation. The only reasonable inference that can be made from the disclosures is that a skilled artisan would understand the patents to disclose ethanol as an alternative to the claimed propylene glycol. View "Eagle Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Slayback Pharma LLC" on Justia Law
Robertson v. Saadat
Under California law, the donor's intent controls the disposition of his or her gametic material upon death. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment sustaining demurrers to her causes of action alleged against defendants. After plaintiff's husband entered into an irreversible coma, she arranged to extract his sperm in hopes of one day conceiving a child with it. Plaintiff stored the sperm in a tissue bank that ultimately came under the control of defendants, and, ten years later, when she requested the sperm, defendants disclosed that they could not locate it. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging contract and tort claims based on the loss of her ability to have a child biologically related to her deceased husband.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the complaint failed to adequately plead facts supporting tort damages. In this case, plaintiff's tort causes of action are all premised on the loss of her ability to conceive with her deceased husband's sperm. However, the court held that the complaint failed to allege facts establishing that plaintiff was legally entitled to use her husband's sperm to conceive a child after he died. In this case, plaintiff's status as his spouse did not entitle her to conceive with his sperm; absent an affirmative showing that the husband intended to allow plaintiff to conceive with his sperm, plaintiff was not entitled to do so; and thus the complaint failed to allege that it was the husband's intent that his sperm be used for posthumous conception. Finally, the court held that plaintiff cannot recover emotional distress damages on her breach of contract cause of action. View "Robertson v. Saadat" on Justia Law
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Research Services, Inc. v. FDA
PMRS petitioned for review of the FDA's denial of PMRS's application to market a prescription opioid drug. The DC Circuit rejected PMRS's challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and held that the FDA's decision to deny the application was reasonable and consistent with law. The court held that the FDA examined the material factors, considered the record as a whole, and provided a reasonable explanation for its decision to deny PMRS's application. In this case, the court had no basis to question the agency's conclusion that the operative version of PMRS's proposed label created the false and misleading impression that the drug possessed abuse deterrent physical and chemical properties. The court also held that the FDA's decision to deny PMRS's request for a hearing was not an abuse of discretion. View "Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Research Services, Inc. v. FDA" on Justia Law
Davis County v. Purdue Pharma, LP
In this case, one of thousands filed by state and local governments against opioid manufacturers across the country, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the second district court granting a manufacturer defendant's motion to transfer the Davis County action to the third district court for discovery and pretrial proceedings, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.Plaintiffs in these cases asserted that manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs misled the public about the safety of these drugs, leading to the opioid epidemic. Fifteen opioid cases were filed in Utah courts. When certain manufacturer defendants moved to consolidate all of the state's pending cases in third district, the court invited judges in other district courts to consider transferring their opioid cases to the third district. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. filed a motion in the second district asking that the court transfer the Davis County action to the third district for discovery and pretrial proceedings. The second district granted the transfer petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court has inherent authority to grant a motion to transfer for pretrial proceedings; and (2) the district court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in transferring this case to the third district. View "Davis County v. Purdue Pharma, LP" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Drugs & Biotech, Utah Supreme Court
In re: Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation
GSK’s patent to an anti-epilepsy drug, Lamictal, was to expire in 2009. Teva sought to market a generic version of Lamictal, lamotrigine, before GSK’s patent expired. Teva submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application. GSK sued for infringement. After Teva received a favorable ruling with respect to one claim in 2005, the parties settled. Teva would begin selling lamotrigine six months before it could have had GSK won but later than if it had succeeded in litigation. GSK promised not to launch an authorized generic (AG) version of Lamictal. Had the parties not settled and had Teva succeeded in litigation, it would have been entitled to a 180-day exclusivity period as the generic first filer but GSK could have launched an AG.Companies that directly purchased Lamictal or lamotrigine (Direct Purchasers) sued, claiming the settlement violated the antitrust laws because GSK “paid” Teva to stay out of the market by promising not to launch an AG, resulting in Direct Purchasers paying more than they would have otherwise.The district court certified a class of all companies that purchased Lamictal from GSK or lamotrigine from Teva. The Third Circuit vacated. The district court certified the class without undertaking the required “rigorous” analysis, failing to resolve key factual disputes, assess competing evidence, and weigh conflicting expert testimony, all of which bear heavily on the predominance requirement, and confused injury with damages. View "In re: Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law
Biogen International GmbH v. Banner Life Sciences, LLC
Biogen holds the New Drug Application for the active ingredient dimethyl fumarate (DMF), which was FDA-approved in 2013 as Tecfidera®, a twice-daily pill for the treatment of relapsing forms of multiple sclerosis at a daily dose of 480 mg. The 001 patent, “Utilization of Dialkylfumarates,” discloses that dialkyl fumarates may have therapeutic uses “in transplantation medicine and for the therapy of autoimmune diseases,” including multiple sclerosis. After the five-year data exclusivity for Tecfidera® expired, Banner submitted an application under 21 U.S.C. 355(b)(2) to market a twice-daily monomethyl fumarate (MMF) pill at a daily dose of 380 mg. Biogen alleged infringement of the 001 patent. Banner argued that section 156(b)(2) limits the scope of the patent’s extension to methods of using the approved product as defined in 156(f)—DMF, its salts, or its esters—and that MMF is none of those things. Biogen responded that section 156(b)(2) limits extension only to uses of any product within the original scope of the claims. The patent will expire in June 2020.The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of non-infringement. The monomethyl ester, covered by claim 1, is not covered by the extension. The scope of a patent term extension under 35 U.S.C. 156 only includes the active ingredient of an approved product, or an ester or salt of that active ingredient; the product at issue does not fall within those categories. View "Biogen International GmbH v. Banner Life Sciences, LLC" on Justia Law
CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc.
CardioNet’s 207 patent, titled “Cardiac Monitoring,” claims priority to an application filed in 2004 and describes cardiac monitoring systems and techniques for detecting and distinguishing atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter from other various forms of cardiac arrythmia. The district court dismissed CardioNet’s patent infringement complaint against InfoBionic, finding that the asserted claims of the patent are ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101.The Federal Circuit reversed, applying the Supreme Court’s two-step “Alice” framework and finding that the asserted claims of the 207 patent are directed to a patent-eligible improvement to cardiac monitoring technology and are not directed to an abstract idea. Nothing in the record suggests that the claims merely computerize pre-existing techniques for diagnosing atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter. View "CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc." on Justia Law
In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation
The counties filed suit in the Northern District of Ohio against manufacturers and distributors of prescription opioids. More than 2,700 other opioid cases have been transferred there by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL). The first Case Management Order put the Counties’ cases on “Track One,” with a March 2019 trial date, setting a deadline in April 2018 for the Counties to amend their complaints. The Counties then asserted claims against 12 Pharmacies as “distributors” of pharmaceuticals to their own retail pharmacies, expressly declining to bring "dispenser" claims. Distributors ship pharmaceuticals wholesale; dispensers fill prescriptions. The Track One parties engaged in massive discovery.Rather than ruling on summary judgment motions, the district court granted the Counties’ motion to sever all but one Pharmacy (Walgreens) from Track One. Trial had been rescheduled for October 2019. The 11 Pharmacies settled with the Counties, agreeing to pay $260 million. The district court canceled the trial, then allowed the Counties to amend their complaints to add “dispenser” claims and ordered discovery to proceed anew. The court refused to rule on dismissal motions and ordered the Pharmacies to produce data on every prescription that they had filled for any opioid medication, anywhere in the U.S., dating back to 2006. The Sixth Circuit ordered that the amendments to the complaints be stricken, noting that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in MDL under 28 U.S.C. 1407 and had been disregarded in several instances. View "In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation" on Justia Law
Amgen Inc. v. Health Care Services
This case arose when Amgen submitted a price increase notice to CCHCS and other registered purchasers. Reuters News made a request under the California Public Records Act, seeking the price increase notices. Amgen then filed a petition for writ of mandamus blocking disclosure. Amgen also moved for a preliminary injunction, which the trial court granted. While this appeal was pending, the trial court sustained CCHCS's demurrer to the mandamus cause of action with leave to amend, and then Amgen chose to dismiss the action instead.The Court of Appeal held that the appeal was not barred by the mootness doctrine where the issues raised are capable of repetition because there will be future price increase notices. Furthermore, the issues are likely to evade review because a pharmaceutical manufacturer has little reason to continue to prosecute a mandamus action after obtaining a preliminary injunction for the 60-day period before a price increase becomes public.On the merits, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that Amgen had sufficiently shown that its price increase notice pursuant to Senate Bill No. 17 was a trade secret despite its disclosure to the registered purchasers. In this case, Amgen failed to explain how its purported trade secret maintained its confidentiality and concomitant value to Amgen when it was disclosed to over 170 purchasers who had the incentive to use the information to their benefit and Amgen's detriment, and were not subject to any restrictions on using or further disseminating the information. Likewise, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the balance of harms favored Amgen. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of Amgen. View "Amgen Inc. v. Health Care Services" on Justia Law
In re Ocular Therapeutix Inc.
In this complaint alleging that Defendants intentionally or recklessly misled investors about Ocular Therapeutix, Inc.'s manufacturing problems the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. 78u-4, 78u-5.In 2015, Ocular submitted a new drug application to the FDA for approval of Dextenza. In 2017, the FDA published its observations of issues at Ocular's manufacturing facility, which resulted in a drop in the company's stock price. Plaintiffs, several shareholders, brought this securities fraud action on behalf of themselves and a putative class of investors alleging violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78t(a). The district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6), the Exchange Act, and the PSLRA. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs did not allege facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter as required by the PSLRA. View "In re Ocular Therapeutix Inc." on Justia Law