Justia Drugs & Biotech Opinion SummariesArticles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
In re Biogen Inc. Securities Litigation
The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of this putative class action alleging violations under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The district court concluded that the initial amended complaint failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). Thereafter, the court denied Plaintiffs’ subsequent motion to vacate the judgment and for leave to file a second amended complaint to include purportedly new evidence. The First Circuit held, on de novo review, that (1) the initial amended complaint failed to plead particularized facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter, as required by the PSLRA; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the judgment and for leave to file a second amended complaint. View "In re Biogen Inc. Securities Litigation" on Justia Law
Brennan v. Zafgen, Inc.
Zafgen Inc.’s investors (Investors) brought a securities fraud class action suit against Zafgen and its Chief Executive Officer (collectively, Defendants) following a significant drop in the share price of the company. Specifically, Investors alleged that the Defendants made several misleading statements regarding Zafgen’s anti-obesity drug Beloranib. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the complaint did not contain facts giving rise to a “cogent and compelling” inference of scienter as required under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed Investors’ claims because the complaint, considered as a whole, did not present allegations giving rise to a cogent and compelling inference of scienter. View "Brennan v. Zafgen, Inc." on Justia Law
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc v. Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary (collectively, Amphastar) and Sandoz Inc. were competitors in the U.S. market for generic enoxaparin, an anticoagulant. Momenta Pharmaceuticals Inc. served as Sandoz’s contract laboratory. Amphastar filed a complaint alleging antitrust violations by Sandoz and Momenta based on Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations to the United States Pharmacopeial Convention, a private standard-setting organization charged with ensuring the quality of drugs. Defendants brought an infringement suit against Amphastar, resulting in a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction prohibiting Amphastar from selling enoxaparin. The preliminary injunction was later vacated, but it did prevent Amphastar from selling its generic enoxaparin for approximately three months. Amphastar then filed this suit under the Sherman Act seeking damages for lost profits during the pendency of the TRO and injunction. The district court dismissed the complaint under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which immunizes good-faith petition of government entities from antitrust liability. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in applying Noerr-Pennington. Remanded for the district court to consider Defendants’ other arguments in the first instance. View "Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc v. Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law
Booker v. Pfizer, Inc.
In 2009, Pfizer, settled claims that it had violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729, and entered into a Corporate Integrity Agreement with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Months later, Booker and Hebron, former Pfizer sales representatives, brought a qui tam action, allegedly on behalf of the United States and several states, asserting that Pfizer had continued to violate the FCA and state analogues. They alleged that Pfizer had continued to knowingly induce third parties to file false claims for payment for Pfizer drugs with government programs like Medicaid by marketing the drug Geodon for off-label uses, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 301, and paying doctors kickbacks for prescribing the drugs Geodon and Pristiq, in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b), (g). They also alleged that Pfizer had violated the FCA "reverse false claims" provision, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(G), by failing to pay the government money owed it under Pfizer's Agreement with HHS, and that Pfizer had violated the FCA's anti-retaliation provision, by terminating Booker's employment. All of these claims were resolved against relators, one on a motion to dismiss and the rest on summary judgment. None of the sovereigns intervened. The First Circuit affirmed the merits decisions and found no error in its management of discovery. The court found relators’ data “woefully inadequate to support their FCA claim.” View "Booker v. Pfizer, Inc." on Justia Law
D’Agostino v. EV3, Inc.
Plaintiff filed filed a qui tam action against a corporation and its subsidiary, both of whom manufacture and market medical devices, alleging that Defendants violated the False Claims Act in selling two particular medical devices to hospitals that seek reimbursement from the federal government through, for example, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Through two subsequent amendments, both with permission of the court, Plaintiff added several defendants and retooled his claims. Plaintiff then requested leave to amend fourth amended complaint. The district court applied the “good cause” standard from Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) to that request and struck the amended complaint. The First Circuit originally held that the district court should have evaluated Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint under the standard set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). On remand, the district court concluded that Plaintiff’s desired amendment failed under that standard. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s request for leave to file his fourth amended complaint was properly denied as futile because none of the claims in Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint was adequately pled. View "D'Agostino v. EV3, Inc." on Justia Law
Lawton v. Takeda Pharmaceutical Co.
Plaintiff brought a qui tam action against Takeda Pharmaceutical Company and its affiliates (collectively, Takeda) and Eli Lilly and Company (Eli Lilly) (collectively, Defendants) under the False Claims Act (FCA) and the False Claims Acts of several different states, alleging that Defendants engaged in an illegal marketing campaign for Actos, a brand name drug approved by the FDA for improving blood sugar control in adults with Type 2 diabetes, and used illegal kickbacks to support that campaign. Plaintiff further alleged that through this campaign, Defendants knowingly caused third parties to submit false reimbursement claims to government entities for off-label uses of Actos. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to plead his claims with the particularity required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 9(b); and (2) the district court similarly did not err when it dismissed Plaintiff’s state claims with prejudice. View "Lawton v. Takeda Pharmaceutical Co." on Justia Law
In re Nexium Antitrust Litigation
AstraZeneca, a drug manufacturer that owns the patents covering Nexium, a prescription heartburn medication, sued Ranbaxy for patent infringement after Ranbaxy announced that it sought to market a generic version of Nexium. The two companies reached a settlement agreement under which Ranbaxy agreed to delay the launch of its generic until a certain date in return for various promises from AstraZeneca. Plaintiffs - pharmaceutical retail outlets and certified classes of direct purchasers and end payers - filed suit, arguing that the terms of the settlement agreements violated federal antitrust laws and state analogues. The jury found that although Plaintiffs had proved an antitrust violation, Plaintiffs had not shown that they suffered an antitrust injury that entitled them to damages. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not commit reversible error in its evidentiary rulings, the formulation of the special verdict form and jury instructions, or its judgment as a matter of law on overarching conspiracy; and (2) the jury verdict rendered harmless any error that may have occurred during the summary judgment proceedings. View "In re Nexium Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law
Garcia v. Novartis Pharms. Corp.
Xolair, an injected drug approved by the FDA for treating allergies, is co-promoted in the United States by Genentech, Inc. and Roche Holdings, Inc. (Genentech) and Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. and Novartis Corp. (Novartis). Relators brought qui tam actions against Genentech and Novartis under the False Claims Act (FCA) and related state statutes, alleging that Defendants caused healthcare providers to submit false claims to the government for reimbursement for Xolair. The district court dismissed the federal claims with prejudice and then declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims and dismissed those claims with prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Relators’ motion to amend; (2) did not err in dismissing the federal claims with prejudice; and (3) erred in dismissing the pendant state-law claims with prejudice. Remanded. View "Garcia v. Novartis Pharms. Corp." on Justia Law
Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp.
Fabry Disease, a rare genetic disorder, leaves afflicted persons unable to synthesize a key enzyme that helps the body break down fats. Untreated, Fabry patients suffer progressively more severe symptoms, including pain in their extremities, gastrointestinal issues, vision and hearing losses, stroke, and heart and kidney failure, eventually leading to premature death. Researchers at the Mt. Sinai School of Medicine developed a method for producing a replacement enzyme, which effectively treats (but does not cure) Fabry. After patenting this method, Mt. Sinai granted an exclusive license to Genzyme, which became the sole producer of the replacement enzyme, "Fabrazyme," the only FDA-approved enzyme replacement therapy for the treatment of Fabry. Genzyme provided the drug to Fabry patients until 2009. After a virus was discovered in improperly cleaned equipment at the company's manufacturing facility, Genzyme reduced production, leading to a Fabrazyme shortage. The company began rationing. Despite setbacks in reestablishing production levels, in 2011 Genzyme diverted some Fabrazyme to the European market, allegedly because of competition Genzyme faced from an alternative enzyme replacement therapy approved only in Europe. Two class action complaints were consolidated and dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed in part, for lack of standing, noting “the utter failure of any plaintiff (other than Mooney) to plausibly allege that he or she suffered an injury in fact as a result of accelerated disease progression or receipt of a contaminated drug.” View "Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp." on Justia Law
In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig.
Warner Chilcott, a brand-name drug manufacturer that owns the patent covering Loestrin 24 Fe, and Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which sought to introduce a generic version of Loestrin 24, entered into a settlement agreement wherein Watson agreed to delay entry of its generic version of Loestrin 24 in exchange for favorable side deals. Thereafter, Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. announced that it would introduce a generic version of Loestrin 24. Warner and Lupin settled on terms similar to those between Warner and Watson. Two putative classes of plaintiffs brought antitrust claims that the settlement agreements were violations of the Sherman Act and constituted illegal restrains on trade under FTC v. Actavis. At issue in this case was whether such settlement agreements are subject to federal antitrust scrutiny where they do not involve reverse payments in pure cash form. The district court dismissed, concluding that Actavis applies only to monetary reverse payments and that Plaintiffs had alleged the existence of non-cash reverse payments only. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the district court erred in determining that non-monetary reverse payments do not fall under the scope of Actavis. Remanded. View "In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law