Justia Drugs & Biotech Opinion Summaries

Defendant was the pharmacy director of a medical center and had influence over decisions concerning which drugs to stock. Levato was the local business manager of a pharmaceutical company. Levato agreed to pay defendant $18,000 not to switch away from his company's drug, and made computer entries recording nine nonexistent speeches given by defendant for the pharmaceutical company; defendant later received another $14,000 for more fictitious speeches. After investigation by an FDA agent, Levato and defendant were indicted. Levato plead guilty and testified against defendant. Defendant was convicted of solicitation and receipt of kickbacks and sentenced to 22 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Memoranda prepared by the Department of Health and Human Services, discovered by the prosecution after trial, did not constitute exculpatory material withheld by the prosecution. The court noted that the documents would have strengthened the prosecution case. View "United States v. Muoghalu" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, citizens of New York, sued pharmaceutical companies (defendants) in New York state court claiming that defendants' hormone replacement therapy drugs caused plaintiffs to develop breast cancer. At issue was whether dismissal of plaintiffs' actions as time-barred under New York law precluded assertion of the same claims in a federal court diversity action in a State where the claims would not be time-barred. The court held that under New York claim preclusion law as articulated in Smith v. Russell Sage College and the many New York appellate decisions applying Russell Sage, the prior grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' New York claims as time-barred precluded the assertion of the same claims in these federal diversity actions in Minnesota. Therefore, the district court properly applied the Full Faith and Credit Statute in these cases, even if the New York Court of Appeals declined in the future to apply statute-of-limitations claim preclusion to more sympathetic plaintiffs. View "Rick, et al. v. Wyeth, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of two federal offenses: one count of aiding and abetting a violation of the so-called Medicare anti-kickback statute, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b)(2) and 18 U.S.C. 2, and one count of aiding and abetting the falsification of a document, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1519 and 2. Defendant raised several claims on appeal. The court held that the district court did not err in admitting testimony concerning statements made by defendant's wife during her interview with the FBI; in admitting evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) that defendant stole funds from previous employers in the healthcare industry; in denying defendant's motion to dismiss count one of the second superseding indictment, which charged a violation of the anti-kickback statute; by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress statements and to declare his proffer agreement unenforceable; and by granting in part the spouse's attorneys' motion to quash a subpoena requiring one of the representatives to produce his entire file regarding the representation of the spouse who was now deceased. The court also held that the district court's jury instructions regarding count one were not erroneous. The court held, however, that the district court erred in calculating the amount of loss under Guidelines 2B4.1 when it used the loss to the victims, rather than the benefit to defendant, as the measure of loss. Therefore, the court concluded that there was procedural error and defendant's sentence was vacated. The court finally vacated the restitution order and remanded for further proceedings. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims. View "United States v. Yielding" on Justia Law

The patents at issue relate to balloon-expandable stents, used to treat occluded blood vessels. Following a remand, the district court found that defendants did not literally infringe the patents and rejected claims that the patents were invalid for lack of description or due to inequitable conduct. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Based on the court's proper clarification of its construction of the term "undulating," there was not substantial evidence to support a finding of infringement, nor was there substantial evidence of inequitable conduct. View "Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff had no adverse reaction to receiving the hepatitis B vaccine in 1997 until after her third dose. At that time, her chest pain was not attributed to the vaccine. Plaintiff saw other doctors for various symptoms and, in 1998, doctors identified "post vaccine syndrome." Plaintiff has had unrelated medical problems, suffered the loss of a child, and has had jobs that involved working with chemicals and bodily fluids. Her 1999 claim for compensation under the Vaccine Act (42 U.S.C. 300aa-1) was denied. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that if was an "unfortunate case," in which plaintiff suffered a multitude of symptoms but could not prove they were caused by the vaccine. View "Lombard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

The FTC sued Lundbeck, Inc., alleging that its acquisition of the drug NeoProfen violated the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 41 et seq., the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7, the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 12-27, the Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971, and unjustly enriched Lundbeck. At issue was whether the district court properly determined that the FTC failed to identify a relevant market where the FTC did not meet its burden of proving that the drugs Indocin IV and Neoprofen were in the same product market. The court held that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous and affirmed the judgment. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Lundbeck, Inc." on Justia Law

Wife, suing on behalf of her deceased husband, (plaintiff) filed tort claims and a breach of warranty claim against pharmaceutical companies, alleging that the prescription Mirapex that husband used to treat his Parkinson's disease lead him to compulsively gamble. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants because plaintiff's claims were time-barred. The court held that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff's claim accrued more than two years before he brought his suit and thus was time-barred. The court also held that because husband became aware of the effect of the Mirapex more than two years before he filed suit, the continuing tort doctrine did not save his claim; that the open courts provision did not operate to save plaintiff's claim; that the district court did not err in determining that the facts were sufficiently developed to establish a concrete injury in 2006 for the purpose of determining ripeness; that the affidavits at issue did not raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether husband's behavioral problems and side effects were so severe as to render him legally incompetent and therefore, the tolling provisions of section 16.0001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code were unavailable; and that plaintiff had not satisfied the requirement that purchasers gave notice of a breach of warranty claim prior to filing suit and therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant on that claim. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Gazal v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, et al." on Justia Law

These consolidated lawsuits involved state tort law claims based on certain drug manufacturers' alleged failure to provide adequate warning labels for the generic drug metoclopramide. State tort law required a manufacturer that was, or should be, aware of its drug's danger to label it in a way that rendered it reasonably safe. On the other hand, federal drug regulations, as interpreted by the FDA, prevented the manufacturers from independently changing their generic drug safety labels. At issue was whether such federal drug regulations applicable to generic drug manufacturers directly conflicted with, and thus preempted, the state law claims. The Court concluded that the federal drug regulations preempted the state law claims because, if manufacturers had independently changed their labels to satisfy their state law duty to attach a safer label to their generic metoclopramide, they would have violated the federal requirement that generic drug labels be the same as the corresponding brand-name drug labels. Thus, it was impossible for the manufacturers to comply with federal and state law. Even if the manufacturers had fulfilled their federal duty to ask for FDA help in strengthening the corresponding brand-name labels, assuming such a duty existed, they would not have satisfied their state tort law duty. State law demanded a safer label, it did not require communication with the FDA about the possibility of a safer label. Therefore, the Court held that when a party could not satisfy its state duties without the Federal Government's special permission and assistance, which was dependent on the exercise of judgment by a federal agency, that party could not independently satisfy those state duties for preemption purposes. The Court also noted that Congress and the FDA retained authority to change the law and regulations if they so desired. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "PLIVA, Inc., et al. v. Mensing; Actavis Elizabeth, LLC v. Mensing; Actavis, Inc., v. Demahy" on Justia Law

Vermont's Prescription Confidentiality Law, Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 4631(d), restricted the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that revealed the prescribing practices of individual doctors. Respondents, Vermont data miners and an association of brand-name drug manufacturers, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials, contending that section 4631(d) violated their rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. At issue was whether section 4631(d) must be tested by heightened judicial scrutiny and, if so, whether Vermont could justify the law. The Court held that the Vermont Statute, which imposed content-based and speaker-based burdens on protected expression, was subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. The Court also held that Vermont's justifications for section 4631(d) did not withstand such heightened scrutiny and therefore, affirmed the Second Circuit's judgment that section 4631(d) unconstitutionally burdened the speech of pharmaceutical marketers and data miners without adequate justification. View "Sorrell, et al. v. IMS Health Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two scientists, brought a suit to enjoin the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") from funding research using human embryonic stem cells ("ESCs") pursuant to the NIH's 2009 Guidelines ("Guidelines"). At issue was whether the preliminary injunction was properly granted where the district court concluded that plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that the Guidelines violated the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, an appropriations rider that barred federal funding for research in which a human embryo was destroyed. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and held that plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail because Dickey-Wicker was ambiguous and the NIH seemed reasonably to have concluded that, although Dickey-Wicker barred funding for the destructive act of deriving an ESC from an embryo, it did not prohibit funding a research project in which an ESC would be used.